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COMMENT
Tailoring Regimes for a Designer Drug: Developing
Civil Liability for Retailers of Synthetic Marijuana
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two years, homeless shelters in cities across America found
themselves in crisis as residents have overdosed, sometimes en masse, on a drug
known as "synthetic marijuana."' The drug's effects are devastating, discriminat-
ing, and bizarre -sending users to the emergency room for seizures, heart at-
tacks, and kidney failure; showing ruthless concentration among homeless pop-
ulations; and creating "zombie-like" effects in users.2 Concerned public health
officials, however, learned quickly that the drug - also popular with another vul-
nerable and cash-strapped population, teenagers'- would prove surprisingly
1. See, e.g., Associated Press, Homeless Across Country Fall Victim to Synthetic Marijuana, Fox
NEws (Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2o16/12/17/homeless-across-country
-fall-victim-to-synthetic-marijuana.html [http://perma.cc/HJ5G-UL4M] ("Nearly 300
homeless people became ill last month in St. Louis."); Jackie Bensen & Andrea Swalec, 11 Peo-
ple Overdose on Synthetic Drug "Bizarro" in Downtown D.C., NBC WASH. (June 7,
2015, 7:34 AM EDT), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/-At-Least-lo -People
-Overdose-on-Synthetic-Marijuana-in-Downtown-DC-3o6311941.html [http://perma.cc
/N9KM-2A83] (reporting a "mass overdose outside [Washington, D.C.'s] largest homeless
shelter on a type of synthetic marijuana"); Eli Rosenberg & Nate Schweber, 33 Suspected of
Overdosing on Synthetic Marijuana in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMEs (July 12, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/2o16/o7/13/nyregion/k2-synthetic-marijuana-overdose-in-brooldyn.html
[http://perma.cc/LZ72-JMWZ] (noting the popularity of one type of synthetic marijuana
among people experiencing homelessness in New York).
2. Rosenberg & Schweber, supra note 1.
3. Synthetic Mariuana Lands Thousands of Young People in the ER, Especially Young Males, NAT'L
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difficult to contain.' As a synthetic or "designer" drug, synthetic marijuana can
be produced from any of hundreds of synthetic cannabinoids; when law enforce-
ment catches wind of a particular strand, manufacturers quickly adjust their for-
mulas.'
Retailers also market synthetic marijuana inconsistently; there are over four
hundred commercial varieties of synthetic cannabinoids,6 which are known by
almost seven hundred street names.' As recently as 2016, synthetic marijuana
could be purchased in small packets off the shelves of gas stations and conven-
ience stores.' Often cheekily labeled as "potpourri" or "incense," so that it can be
sold openly alongside drug paraphernalia, and bearing a disclaimer that its con-
tents are not for human consumption, the packets feature colorful, whimsical
packaging, often alluding to natural marijuana.
Many of the challenges of regulating synthetic marijuana arise from legal
complexities defining its nature. The drug takes its name from the chemical sim-
ilarity between synthetic annabinoids and THC, the active ingredient in natural
marijuana,' but produces stronger and less predictable effects than its natural
4. See Andy Rosen & Michael Levenson, Mass., N.H. Crack Down on 'Synthetic Marijuana,' BOS.
GLOBE (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2o14/o8/15/mass-crack
-down-synthetic-marijuana/E5mt2tXU9jNCEis5ofVqjO/story.html [http://perma.cc/PRB7
-7T86]; Rosenberg & Schweber, supra note 1; Synthetic Cannabinoids, AM. Ass'N POISON CON-
TROL CENTERS, http://www.aapcc.org/alerts/synthetic-cannabinoids [http://perma.cc
/U3G 5-HUH8].
5. Zunny Losoya, Comment, Synthetic Drugs-Emergence, Legislation, and the Criminal and Legal
Aftermath ofBroad Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 401, 410 -11 (2013).
6. Mike Stucka, List of Banned Synthetic Marijuana Brands, MACON TELEGRAPH (Mar. 28, 2012,
5:28 PM), http://www.macon.com/news/local/crime/article2864749o.html [http://perma
.cc/4W8C-5 ICVvB].
7. 7oo Names for Synthetic Marijuana (Spice, K-2, etc.), SPICE ADDICTION SUPPORT (Mar. 1, 2017),
http://spiceaddictionsupport.org/street-names-for-synthetic-marijuana [http://perma.cc
/H9NR-WVLL].
8. See Jaclyn Reiss, What Is Synthetic Marijuana?, Bos. GLOBE (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.bos-
tonglobe.com/metro/2016/ol/13/what-synthetic-marijuana/x26SioodViJPPYtgGPm
9GK/story.html [http://perma.cc/ESY7-Z7BR] ("In recent years, synthetic marijuana has
been fairly easy to get. It is ... often sold at gas stations, smoke shops, and mom-and-pop
stores.").
9. Dangerous Synthetic Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Caucus on Int'l Narcotics Control, 113th Cong.
5 (2013) (statement of Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diver-
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counterpart.o One study found that a batch of synthetic marijuana could be
eighty-five times more potent-or capable of producing effects at a particular
dosage-than natural marijuana;" a study in the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report suggests that the potency
may be up to one hundred times greater.12 In order to evade law enforcement,
manufacturers frequently alter the chemical compound sprayed over the dried
plant matter that makes up the drug; as a result of this haphazard production
method, two packages with identical labels can contain drugs with substantially
different potencies." Consumers are thus unable to make predictions about the
contents of the substance they are ingesting. This unpredictability, combined
with the drug's potency,1 makes each user "unwittingly a guinea pig in an un-
controlled laboratory test."
That variable chemical composition creates a wide range of reactions. Syn-
thetic marijuana has powerful psychoactive effects; some, such as altered per-
ception, are recreational, while others are more insidious, including violent be-
havior and suicidal ideation.16 Physically, the drug can cause uncontrollable
vomiting, hemorrhaging, seizures, heart attacks, and organ failure." Despite
10. Jeneen Interlandi, Synthetic Marijuana Has Real Risks, CONSUMER REP. (May 7, 2016),
http://www.consumerreports.org/drugs/synthetic-marijuana-real-risks [http://perma.cc
/46JQ-QTL2].
ii. Axel J. Adams et al., "Zombie" Outbreak Caused by the Synthetic CannabinoidAMB-FUBINACA
in New York, 376 NEw ENG. J. MED. 235, 240 (2017).
12. Anne M. Riederer, Acute Poisonings from Synthetic Cannabinoids-o U.S. Toxicology Investiga-
tors Consortium Registry Sites, 2o1o-2o15, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKIy. REP. 692, 692
(2016).
13. See Kevin T. Brown, Note, A Problem of Design: Proposed Changes to Controlled Substance Ana-
logue Statutes-Modifying Tennessee's Approach, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 395, 404 (2014).
14. See Marc Santora, Drug 85 Times as Potent as Marijuana Caused a "Zombielike" State in Brooklyn,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/12/14/nyregion/zombielike
-state-was-caused-by-synthetic-marijuana.htm [http://perma.cc/TB4S-688D].
15. Rannazzisi Statement, supra note 9, at 6.
16. For a more in-depth discussion of these effects, see Losoya, supra note 5, at 401-02, which
cites, among other examples, a teenager in Kentucky who experienced paralysis after smoking
synthetic marijuana and a twenty-two-year-old man who "tortured, killed, and ate his room-
mate's dog" while high on the drug.
17. See, e.g., Moustafa Elsheshtawy et al., Synthetic Marijuana Induced Acute Nonischemic Left Ven-
tricular Dysfunction, CASE REP. CARDIOLOGY, 2016, art. 9625758, at 1; Dolkar Sherpa et al., Syn-
thetic Cannabinoids: The Multi-Organ Failure and Metabolic Derangements Associated with Get-
ting High, J. COMMUNITY HoSP. INTERNAL MED. PERSP., Sept. 2015, art. 27540, at 1, 4.
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these risks, the drug remains popular because of its accessibility" and low price
relative to natural marijuana.9
While law enforcement officers have begun to crack down on sales at main-
stream retail establishments (such as gas stations), the drug remains widely
available online and in stores selling drug paraphernalia. Because it can be pro-
duced from a wide range of synthetic compounds, manufacturers can alter its
chemical basis to evade criminal20 or civil liability.2 1 In the ensuing game of legal
"whack-a-mole,"22 the rapid introduction of new compounds makes regulation
of synthetic marijuana entirely reactive to creative manufacturers.23 These swift
and frequent changes - coupled with variations in the product's packaging and
labeling - have made it difficult for legislators and law enforcement to determine
whether a particular substance can be treated as synthetic marijuana when its
labeling and chemical composition do not offer clear identifying markers.
This Comment suggests a two-pronged approach for addressing this public
health crisis. First, legislative reform is needed to combat this new challenge in
is. Rannazzisi Statement, supra note 9, at 5.
ig. Synthetic marijuana sells for around $50 per ounce in bulk or around $1o for a small packet.
Leon Neyfakh, What Is the Deal with Synthetic Marijuana?, SLATE (July 15, 2016, 12:35 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and politics/crime/2o16/o2/synthetic-marijuana is
a weird and confusing drug hereswhat you needtto.html [http://perma.cc/GYZ7
-MGJ2]. Natural marijuana, by contrast, usually sells for between $250 and $300 per ounce
in Colorado. See Julie Verhage, This Survey Says that Marijuana Prices Are Crashing in
Colorado, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2015, 8:13 AM EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar-
ticles/2015- o6 -22/this-survey-says-that-marijuana-prices-are-crashing-in-colorado
[http://perma.cc/G2NA-XSS2]; see also Eliza Gray, The Drug Threat in Plain Sight, TIME, Apr.
21, 2014, at 24, 31 (quoting a Colorado state representative as suggesting that natural mariju-
ana costs $300 to $5oo an ounce).
20. In criminal enforcement regimes, drugs are regulated through a process known as "schedul-
ing,' in which the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) will prohibit a drug or class of
drugs based on its dangerousness and potential for abuse. This process, however, depends
upon the ability to identify a drug by its chemical composition. See Drug Schedules, U.S. DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml [http://perma.cc/6N7M
-2RGJ].
21. Olga Khazan, Synthetic Drugs Are Multiplying Too Fast for Regulators To Outlaw Them, ATLAN-
TIC (June 27, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2o13/o6/synthetic
-drugs-are-multiplying-too-fast-for-regulators-to-outlaw-them/277321 [http://perma.cc
/ 7RJV-RY86].
22. See, e.g., id.; Neyfakh, supra note 19.
23. Rannazzisi Statement, supra note 9, at 25-26 ("[T]hese chemicals can be asily synthesized to
stay one step ahead of control."); see also Riederer, supra note 12, at 692 (" [E]nforcement is
hampered by the continual introduction of new chemical compounds.").
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a comprehensive manner. Because local governments are uniquely well posi-
tioned to identify these actors and respond to the needs of their communities,24
this Comment suggests that legislative reforms be developed to enable city and
county attorneys to bring public tort actions, such as public nuisance and unfair
competition claims,2 5 against synthetic marijuana retailers. Comprehensive leg-
islative reform will allow local governments and other stakeholders to use tort
law's flexible regulatory potential to curb the spread of synthetic marijuana's
harmful effects through some of the country's most vulnerable populations. Un-
til those laws are passed, though, this Comment suggests that private plaintiffs
can leverage tort law to bring novel claims against synthetic marijuana retailers.
Civil liability offers several advantages relative to criminal law regimes in this
arena. It avoids perpetuating the racialized criminalization of drug use2 6 and col-
lateral civil consequences27 of the war on drugs. Regulators, meanwhile, can ben-
efit from lower evidentiary standards and mens rea requirements,2 as well as the
availability of injunctive relief and civil penalties.29 This Comment also argues
that tort strategies can make use of the "representational" approach to identify-
ing synthetic marijuana, which looks holistically at the effects of a product's
packaging, marketing, or manner of sale, rather than relying on strictly chemical
definitions of the drug. Expanding regulation beyond a chemical understanding
of synthetic marijuana makes it easier to target retailers who engage in deceptive
24. See Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public Law
Offices, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVO-
CACY 51, 60 (Kathleen Claussen et al. eds., 2008).
25. See generally 7 & 11 STUART M. SPEISERET AL., THE AMERICANLAWOF TORTS §§ 20.A, 34 (1983)
(surveying the law of public nuisance and unfair competition claims).
26. See, e.g., Criminal justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact
-sheet [http://perma.cc/5S38-G89G] (noting that "African Americans and whites use drugs
at similar rates, but the imprisonment rate of African Americans for drug charges is almost 6
times that of whites" and that "African Americans represent 12.5% of illicit drug users, but
29% of those arrested for drug offenses and 33% of those incarcerated in state facilities for
drug offenses"). See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEwJIM CRow: MASS INCARCERA-
TION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (recounting how the criminal justice system,
and the war on drugs in particular, has led to racialized mass incarceration).
27. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 457 (2010); Roadblocks to Reentry, LEGAL ACTION CTR.
(2004), http://lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LACPrintReport.pdf
[http://perma.cc/H8GA-66TP]; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 137-72 (discussing how
collateral consequences burden offenders' reintegration into society).
28. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law,
101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1805-o6 (1992); Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal
Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENERL.J. 719, 720 (2008).
29. See Mann, supra note 28, at 1863.
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sales and marketing practices and make synthetic cannabinoids easily accessible
to vulnerable populations.
Part I identifies the conceptual frameworks through which courts, legisla-
tures, and law enforcement officials have approached synthetic marijuana: a
"chemical" approach, a "household products" approach, and a "representational"
approach. Part II calls for greater involvement by local government actors in de-
veloping and enforcing tort liability regimes targeting retailers who sell synthetic
marijuana. Because instituting such a regime would require substantial time and
resources, Part II also suggests an alternative short-term recourse for private
plaintiffs under the tort doctrine of "manifestly unreasonable design"o
(MUD)."
I. THREE CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO SYNTHETIC MARIJUANA
Efforts to regulate synthetic marijuana are generally based on one of three
conceptual frames: a "chemical approach" focused on the drug's underlying
chemical basis; a "household products" approach that takes marketing claims
about the product at face value and regulates sales through labeling laws; and a
"representational" approach that looks holistically at the conceptual import of a
product's packaging, marketing, or manner of sale. Traditional drug regulation
relies on the notion that drugs can predictably be identified by their chemical
composition. Synthetic marijuana is different, however, and regulatory efforts
have lagged insofar as they have failed to move away from a strictly chemical
approach. The household products approach offers one alternative, but has not
been widely adopted and may not force manufacturers or retailers to fully inter-
nalize the drug's social costs. The representational approach is ultimately the
most promising because of its flexibility and compatibility with tort liability re-
gimes. This Comment, therefore, recommends that litigants base their tort
claims on this more flexible and nuanced understanding.
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1998) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT].
31. This Comment focuses on expanding liability for sellers, rather than manufacturers, of syn-
thetic marijuana because manufacturers are often unknown or difficult to locate, and fre-
quently based outside of the United States. By contrast, stores that sell synthetic marijuana
directly to consumers can be identified with relative ease. For similar reasons, claims against
online retailers -who are likely to be similarly evasive -are left aside in favor of a focus on
brick-and-mortar stores that lawmakers and enforcers can recognize within their own com-
munities. See Rannazzisi Statement, supra note 9, at II ("The ease with which foreign chem-
ists can develop and manufacture designer drugs in clandestine laboratories located outside
of the United States[] creates challenges for the administrative scheduling option when deal-
ing with large-scale manufacturing and distribution of designer drugs.").
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A. The Chemical Approach
The chemical approach identifies a substance as synthetic marijuana if it con-
tains prohibited chemical compounds. Identification via the presence of prohib-
ited compounds has been the dominant lens through which regulation has been
attempted. Federal statutes embody the chemical approach -twenty-six syn-
thetic drugs were initially listed as Schedule I controlled substances under the
2012 Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act,32 and additional compounds have
been added." In addition, all fifty states34 and more than two hundred cities"
have used the chemical approach to ban synthetic cannabinoids either by pro-
hibiting specific compounds or by incorporating the federal schedules.
The chief advantage of the chemical approach is clarity for both enforcers
and regulated parties: laboratory tests can confirm that the drug in question is a
controlled substance, and, once procured, such evidence is easy to present in
court to establish a defendant's unlawful conduct. Outlawing the sale or distri-
bution of a particular chemical compound provides clear notice of prohibited
conduct to sellers and manufacturers. But despite the clear boundaries this ap-
proach offers, it has largely proven inadequate to contain synthetic marijuana for
several reasons.3 6 First, the process of identifying and banning strands of syn-
thetic marijuana compound-by-compound has struggled to keep pace with
manufacturers who are able to rapidly alter synthetic marijuana's design." In
32. Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 1152, 126 Stat. 993, 1130-
32.
33. Rannazzisi Statement, supra note 9, at 9.
34. See Synthetic Cannabinoids Banned by Statute or Regulation Through 2o13, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR
MODEL ST. DRUG LAws, http://www.namsdl.org/library/3764BBF9-1372-636C-DDlC21883
EFF8A94 [http://perma.cc/S339-869H]; accord Emerging Drug Threats: Synthetic Drug, NAT'L
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (NOV. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Emerging Drug Threats],
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/justice/synthetic-drug-threats.aspx [http://perma.cc
/4GRH-7JVJ].
3s. See City Ordinances - Synthetic Substances, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR MODEL ST. DRUG LAws (Oct.
18, 2013), http://www.namsdl.org/library/C8B389DC-19B9-ElC5-31DBE858808DEB7A
[http://perma.cc/HZB9-NV7L].
36. See Losoya, supra note 5, at 410-15.
37. See, e.g., Rannazzisi Statement, supra note 9, at 11 ("DEA has identified over 75 additional
synthetic cannabinoids that are not controlled but are currently appearing in the domestic
marketplace ... or discussed on the Internet. The ease with which foreign chemists can de-
velop and manufacture designer drugs . . . creates challenges for the administrative schedul-
ing option. . . ."); Sara Lykken, We Really Need To Talk: Adapting FDA Processes to Rapid
Change, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 357, 384-86 (2013); Timothy P. Stackhouse, Note, Regulators in
Wackyland: Capturing the Last of the Designer Drugs, 54ARIZ. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (2012) ("The
traditional approach of individually listing drugs as they become a problem is too slow, and
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order to be prohibited under the chemical approach, legislators must single out
a chemical. The Federal Analogue Act" expands the class of prohibited sub-
stances to "analogues" that have "substantially similar" chemical structures to
controlled substances and are used or sold to produce pharmacological effects."
While the Act expands the class of substances that may be targeted under the
chemical approach, analogues offer less regulatory flexibility than it might seem.
Because the government must establish both chemical similarity and the intent
to distribute products for human consumption, analogues are substantially more
burdensome to prosecute than controlled substances.40 Even when expanded be-
yond explicitly prohibited compounds, chemical approaches have little hope of
responding to the dynamism of synthetic marijuana.
Second, unlike natural marijuana and other drugs, synthetic marijuana does
not depend upon the purity of any underlying substance to create its effects. It
is therefore ill suited to regulation within an exclusively chemical framework be-
cause manufacturers have an array of synthetic compounds from which to pro-
duce their products. The chemical approach thus also has the perverse effect of
instructing manufacturers, who can tailor their compounds based on those listed
in the U.S. Code and the Federal Register, on how to evade law enforcement.4 1
Third, the fact that synthetic marijuana is purposefully mislabeled and sold
openly in stores makes it difficult for law enforcement to prove that defendants
knowingly or intentionally sold controlled substances or analogues and, accord-
ingly, to establish the requisite mens rea for criminal prosecution.4 2
there are too many new compounds to replace them as soon as they are banned. Analogue
acts, which require an easily exploited intent requirement to be valid, suffer from vagueness
and overbreadth.").
38. 21 U.S.C. § 813 (2012).
39. Because the Analogue Act treats analogues as controlled substances insofar as they are in-
tended for human consumption, see id., the labels on packets of synthetic marijuana proclaim
that the packet's contents are "not for human consumption" in an effort to circumvent the Act.
40. Hari Sathappan, The Federal Controlled Substances Analogue Act: An Antiquated Solution Meets
an Evolving Problem, OHIO ST. J. ClM. L.: AMICI BLOG, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students
/groups/osjcl/amici-blog/the-federal-controlled-substances-analogue-act-an-antiquated
-solution-meets-an-evolving-problem [http://perma.cc/672S-M4XG].
41. Brown, supra note 13, at 399; see also Kelly Puente, Family of Teen Who Died Smoking Synthetic
Pot Files Lawsuit Against Santa Ana Smoke Shop, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Jan. 21, 2015, 4:10
PM), http://www.ocregister.com/2o15/o1/21/family-of-teen-who-died-smoking-synthetic
-pot-files-lawsuit-against-santa-ana-smoke-shop [http://perma.cc/S5JE-ZWKS] (describ-
ing how a California teen was killed by a version of synthetic marijuana that was a derivative
of another version that had already been banned).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Makkar, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1313 (N.D. Olda. 2016) (finding that
the government failed to establish the mens rea necessary to maintain conviction under the
Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act); People v. Chatha, 33 N.E. 3d 277, 285 (Ill.
771
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Finally, because the identification must occur before the substance is banned
and then again to prove that the substances are identical, the chemical approach
begets significant costs: testing for controlled substances and analogues is an
expensive and burdensome process. The chemical approach relies heavily on ex-
pert witnesses and on sophisticated scientific testing.43 The former Deputy As-
sistant Administrator for the DEA's Office of Diversion Control, Joseph Rannaz-
zisi, notes that "the current approach to the designer drug problem comes at a
high cost to the government," including "a strain on laboratories and scientific
staff," citing, for example, a $300,000 agency purchase of "reference standards"
for synthetic drugs.44 These costs, coupled with the problem of inflexibility,
demonstrate that the chemical approach is incapable of providing a sufficient
regulatory response to synthetic marijuana.
B. The Household Products Approach
An alternative to the narrow chemical approach, the household products ap-
proach, focuses not on a substance's chemical composition but on manufactur-
ers' claims about how it should be used. Strictly followed, this approach entails
treating synthetic marijuana products as the benign consumer commodities they
claim to be. This understanding follows the fiction of a product's disclaimers,
conceptualizing synthetic marijuana as a regular consumer product and penaliz-
ing manufacturers and retailers for creating and distributing products that fail
to comply with labeling requirements. The theoretical aim of a household prod-
ucts approach is to hold manufacturers and retailers to their statements by
strictly enforcing labeling laws and thereby raising the costs of producing syn-
thetic marijuana immensely.45 And, if manufacturers are unable to comply with
App. Ct. 2015) (holding that the government did not establish that the defendant who sold
synthetic marijuana labeled as potpourri knew he was selling a controlled substance); see also
Stackhouse, supra note 37, at 1133-34 (discussing the challenges of proving under an analogue
act that a product is intended for human consumption and suggesting alternatives); Gray,
supra note 19, at 30 (" [T]he Potter County district attorney[] also blames the legal ambiguity
created when these substances are sold openly, labeled as herbal incense or potpourri ....
'Texas law requires that a person intentionally or knowingly deliver an illegal substance ....
When you step into the storefront, all of that goes away' .... ).
43. Rannazzisi Statement, supra note 9, at 3. Rannazzisi also notes that targeting synthetic drugs
under the chemical approach "requir[ed] the DEA to devote a large amount of its resources
to compiling the necessary scientific data and information [and] initiate control actions." Id.
at 20.
44. Id. at 22.
45. For examples of scholars proposing solutions in the mold of the household products ap-
proach, see Lykken, supra note 37, which suggests adapting FDA communication strategies
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traditional labeling requirements, the household products approach functions as
a shadow prohibition.
Although no jurisdiction has fully embraced the household products ap-
proach, a series of cases brought by New York Attorney General Eric Schneider-
man against New York-based smoke shops came closest to enacting this ap-
proach. These cases proceeded on unfair competition grounds as well as on the
theory that, based on their labels, synthetic drugs were nonprescription drugs
and therefore subject to state and federal labeling laws.46 Accordingly, commer-
cial distribution of synthetic marijuana packets not labeled with necessary infor-
mation -including ingredients and the addresses of the manufacturer and dis-
tributor -constituted an unlawful business practice under New York's General
Business Law section 349-47 Some of these cases succeeded in obtaining injunc-
tive relief and civil penalties from several New York retailers.48 However, at least
one court, while upholding deceptive practices claims, rejected the state's efforts
to enforce labeling laws on the grounds that this authority was vested exclusively
in the FDA and the New York Commissioner of Health.4 9
The household products approach attempts to foreclose the safe harbors for
manufacturers who mislabel their drugs as consumer products -loopholes that
exacerbate the challenge of regulating synthetic drug retailers. Yet, the house-
hold products approach is lacking in a few respects. This approach has not been
widely adopted and has failed to gain traction beyond the cases cited above. In
particular, Moss suggests that courts might be hostile to nonadministrative bod-
ies zealously enforcing labeling requirements. Furthermore, tightening labeling
requirements increases the transaction costs of production and distribution, but
in a highly lucrative industry,o manufacturers are likely to adjust to these costs
in order to keep their channels of distribution open, suggesting that the house-
more quicldy to changes in drug production; and Stackhouse, supra note 37, which proposes,
among other legislative reforms, a "bona fide use" exception to the Federal Analogue Act that
would require distributors and manufacturers of alleged household products, such as bath
salts, to demonstrate a product's fitness for its stated purpose.
46. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1460 (2012); see, e.g., People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Jamail, 32 N.Y.S. 3d
828, 829 (Sup. Ct. 2016).
47. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 349 (McKinney 2014).
48. See, e.g., Janail, 32 N.Y.S. 3d at 829; Press Release, Att'y Gen. Eric T. Schneiderman, A.G.
Schneiderman Wins Court Victory in Push To Ban Mislabeled Drugs from Head Shops (Oct.
25, 2012), http://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-wins-court-victory-push-ban
-mislabeled-drugs-head-shops [http://perma.cc/43TT-ZJVP].
49. See People v. Moss, No. 20556/12, 2013 WL 6497868, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 6, 2013).
50. Matthew Speiser, The Synthetic Marijuana Trade Is a Multi-Million Dollar Industry, Bus. IN-
SIDER (Sept. 5, 2015, 8:3o AM), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/dea-busts-show
-lucrativeness-of-synthetics-2o15- 9 [http://perma.cc/9ZS2-9D271.
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hold products approach might not provide enduring relief. Finally, the house-
hold products approach does not force distributors to internalize the most sig-
nificant harms of synthetic marijuana - the drug's toll on human health and well-
being. Instead, this approach focuses on, for example, the failure to include a
manufacturer's address, from which the harm to any given consumer is minimal.
C. The Representational Approach
The inadequacies of the chemical and household products approaches have
begotten a more dynamic understanding of synthetic marijuana in some juris-
dictions: the representational approach. While there are variations, the driving
question behind the representational approach is whether a product has been
represented as synthetic marijuana. In 2015, the New York City Council banned
the sale not only of specific synthetic cannabinoids but also of any substance
"represented to be" a prohibited synthetic drug." The law defines "representa-
tion" to include nonverbal portrayals about the substance's "price, nature, use or
effect" as well as "packaging in a manner normally used" for synthetic drugs.52
A similar ordinance in Houston prohibits the sale of plant material containing a
synthetic chemical that "has no legitimate relation to the advertised use of the
product," eliminating safe harbors for drugs masquerading as household prod-
ucts, as well as those with "packaging or labeling" or "verbal or written repre-
sentations" that suggest the substance "mimics the pharmacological effects of
marihuana."" These flexible definitions are able to capture the sale, for example,
of packages of synthetic marijuana that mimic the packaging and slogans of
known synthetic marijuana brands but contain strands of synthetic canna-
binoids that have not yet been classified as controlled substances. And this ap-
proach, which lends itself to enforcement under tort theories, enables a wider
range of authorities - beyond the FDA and state public health agencies - to bring
civil actions against synthetic marijuana retailers.
Courts engaging in representational analysis have considered evidence that
the substance at issue was sold only to customers over eighteen or alongside drug
paraphernalia;54 sold at an inflated price;ss or packaged in a manner similar to
51. N.Y.C., NY, Local Law 917-A (Oct. 20, 2015).
52. Id.
53. Hous., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. 17, S 28-571 (2017).
54. See United States v. Makkar, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1315 (N.D. Okla. 2016); State ex rel. DeWine
v. Fred's Party Ctr., Inc., 2014 -Ohio-23 58 at ¶ 77 (Ct. App.), 13 N.E. 3d 699.
55. See People v. Chatha, 33 N.E. 3d 277, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
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other, known synthetic drug products.56 One New York court held that infer-
ences about the nature of a substance could be drawn from representations other
than direct verbal communications between a buyer and seller."
This approach has found mixed success in court. The representational ap-
proach was successfully employed in State ex rel. DeWine v. Fred's Party Center,
Inc., in which the government obtained relief through a nuisance abatement ac-
tion." The court in Fred's Party Center noted that the products at issue were sold
at an inflated price and inferred that the products, although labeled as incense
and potpourri, could be classified as synthetic drugs." In other instances, the
representational approach has been less successful, likely because of authorities'
continued reliance on criminal prosecutions rather than civil liability. The courts
in both United States v. Makkar and People v. Chatha engaged in representational
analysis,6 0 but nevertheless found that the government could not establish the
requisite mens rea for a criminal prosecution.6 1 In Makkar, the court conceded
that the evidence supported a finding that the defendants knew they were selling
a controlled substance analogue, but held that the defendant retailers could not
be found guilty absent proof that they knew the substance's specific chemical
composition.6 2 The court in Chatha noted "the near impossibility of proving
knowing possession i  cases involving such lab-manufactured chemicals."6 3 These
examples demonstrate the problems of overreliance on the chemical approach
and also suggest that the representational approach will be most successful if
regulatory strategies shift towards civil, rather than criminal, theories of liability.
Relaxed mens rea requirements in civil actions mean that authorities can exploit
the full flexibility of the representational approach.6 4
56. See Makkar, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1313.
57. People v. Gonell, 789 N.Y.S.2d 675, 678 (Crim. Ct. 2005) (" [A] 'representation' 'is not limited
to' an oral or a written representation . . .. [A] seller may 'represent' a substance to be a con-
trolled substance by its appearance and/or packaging alone. . . ." (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 3383(1)(c) (McKinney 2004)).
58. Fred's Party Ctr., Inc., 2014 -Ohio-2 358.
59. Id. ¶¶ 19, 77.
6o. Makkar, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1315 (noting, for instance, that a product labeled as incense "was
frequently sold with wrapping papers for smoking"); People v. Chatha, 33 N.E.3d 277, 283, 287
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (citing a lower court opinion pointing to evidence that a product labeled
as potpourri was sold at an inflated price and in a manner suggestive of an illegal drug sale).
61. Makkar, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1311; Chatha, 33 N.E. 3d at 288.
62. Makkar, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1315.
63. Chatha, 33 N.E. 3d at 286.
64. See Mann, supra note 28, at 1805; Simons, supra note 28, at 722.
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The representational approach allows courts and regulators to dispel the fic-
tion of synthetic marijuana's labeling and draw inferences by holistically exam-
ining the transaction at issue. Just as importantly, categorizing substances based
on common representations avoids many of the costs and obstacles of the chem-
ical approach by eliminating the need for expensive laboratory testing. The rep-
resentational approach also avoids the need, present in the chemical approach,
to work to reach beyond the compounds that have been placed on controlled
substance schedules. While criminal enforcement relies heavily on these pro-
cesses, many civil causes of action, with lower intent requirements and burdens
of proof, do not.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the representational approach will
prove sufficiently robust. Because the representational pproach is highly discre-
tionary, it offers judges and juries little guidance on when a manufacturer or re-
tailer represents a product as synthetic marijuana. Without clear standards to
govern judicial analysis, a representational approach risks devolving into "I
know it when I see it."65 Similarly, the approach might prove too narrow: inquir-
ing into whether a defendant represented a product as synthetic marijuana can
devolve into a repackaged intent or knowledge standard if too much focus is
placed on an individual defendant's conduct rather than a product's labeling,
packaging, and manner of sale. Finally, the representational approach raises
questions about the relevant timeframe for courts to employ in their analysis and
market definition. Defendants can easily modify marketing strategies or con-
sumer interactions in response to regulation. That flexibility makes the selection
of products that serve as reference points for whether a product resembles
banned substances challenging. Nevertheless, as the next Part illustrates, the
representational approach has the potential to be useful to local governments
bringing tort actions against synthetic marijuana retailers in their communities.
II. EXPANDING CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SYNTHETIC MARIJUANA
RETAILERS
The flexible chemical structure of synthetic marijuana, along with loopholes
that retailers can exploit, raises unique challenges for regulation. As the previous
Part illustrated, the drug's deceptive packaging and erratic chemical composition
necessitate a move away from strict reliance on the chemical approach towards
one that incorporates representational nalysis. These challenges are best ad-
dressed through tort law, which emphasizes foreseeability of harm, deceptive
marketing practices, and harm to users in place of the criminal law's focus on
chemical structures and the conduct of individual defendants. Later, in Section
776
65. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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II.B, this Comment argues that tort doctrine already holds promise to regulate
synthetic marijuana s a manifestly unreasonable design (MUD). A superior, but
longer term, solution is the subject of Section II.A. Specifically, jurisdictions
should develop legislative solutions that adapt current tort regimes to address
synthetic marijuana.
While greater involvement by local government actors in combating syn-
thetic marijuana holds promise for addressing the problem systematically, the
political process may move too slowly to address the harms of synthetic mariju-
ana in the short term. Where this process fails, the plaintiffs' bar may be able to
fill a gap by litigating under the theory that synthetic marijuana possesses a
MUD. Section II.B outlines the advantages and obstacles to such a claim. The
challenges of MUD litigation suggest that legislative efforts coupled with local
civil enforcement may provide more enduring reform.
A. Legislative Reform
Local governments are well positioned to craft ordinances regulating syn-
thetic marijuana and enforce these regimes through public litigation under pub-
lic nuisance, unfair competition, and related tort theories.6 6 Particularly "com-
pared to the entities typically relied on to pursue affirmative litigation, local
public law offices are uniquely accessible and accountable" and able to be respon-
sive to the needs of their communities.6 7 Additionally, the unpredictability of
synthetic marijuana makes nimble government responses all the more im-
portant, a condition more easily met in local government settings.
While the needs and capacities of individual communities will vary, local or-
dinances should have three central features to expand possibilities for liability
and empower local jurisdictions with respect to the synthetic drug crisis: they
should provide for civil, rather than criminal, sanctions; incorporate multiple
definitions of synthetic marijuana; and be enforceable by city and county attor-
neys.
1. Focusing enforcement on the proper individuals is crucial, and commer-
cial retailers, not individual users, are the appropriate targets if enforcement
against synthetic marijuana expands. Criminalizing possession and low-level
dealing of synthetic marijuana risks exacerbating the failures of the ongoing war
777
66. See Losoya, supra note 5, at 427-28 (outlining the advantages of local enforcement against yn-
thetic drug retailers).
67. Morris, supra note 24, at 6o.
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on drugs,68 chief among them racial disparities in drug-related arrests and incar-
ceration and the burdens and stigma imposed by contact with the criminal jus-
tice system.69 Given the evidence that punitive approaches to drug use often do
more harm than good,70 regulatory efforts should move away from criminal en-
forcement against individual synthetic marijuana users. Instead, local authorities
should focus on imposing civil sanctions on retailers and disrupting institution-
alized profitmaking from the sale of synthetic drugs. Unfortunately, many syn-
thetic marijuana ordinances fall short on this front, criminalizing individual pos-
session or sale - in some cases for amounts as small as ten packets" - and
imposing prison sentences rather than relying on fines and civil penalties.72
The harms arising from the widespread accessibility of synthetic marijuana
are better addressed through a civil regulatory regime targeting larger commer-
cial establishments. Unfair competition and nuisance laws provide a good ave-
nue for these claims. Colorado, for example, amended its state consumer protec-
tion statute in 2015 to make the sale of synthetic cannabinoids a deceptive trade
practice punishable by a fine of up to $500,000 per sachet." Cities can also seek
injunctive relief. Employing a public nuisance strategy, Duluth, Minnesota ob-
tained a temporary injunction against a store selling synthetic marijuana, citing
public urination and disruptive activity outside of the store, as well as increased
burdens on local hospitals.74 Similarly, city officials in Lincoln, Nebraska pre-
vailed on a public nuisance claim by showing "the recent increase of medical
68. See, e.g., Thomas Kerr et al., The Public Health and Social Impacts of Drug Market Enforcement:
A Review of the Evidence, 16 INT'L. J. DRUG POL'Y 210, 210 (2005) (finding with respect to pu-
nitive policies to curb illicit drug use that "a growing body of research indicates that these
approaches have substantial potential to produce harmful health and social impacts"); War on
Drugs: Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POL'Y 2
(June 2011), http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03
/GCDP WaronDrugsEN.pdf [http://perma.cc/FG4P-XUM8] ("The global war on drugs
has failed.').
69. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Kerr et al., supra note 68, at 216.
71. See, e.g., N.Y.C., NY, Local Law 917-A § 4 (b) (Oct. 20, 2015).
72. Id. § 4(c) ("Any person or entity that violates subdivision a of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $5,ooo or imprisonment of up to one
year, or both."); see also City Ordinances- Synthetic Substances, supra note 35 (showing possible
terms of imprisonment for up to one year in cities in Alaska, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Missis-
sippi and up to six months in cities in Alaska, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Missis-
sippi, and Utah).
73. COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-725(2)(a) (West 2015) (classifying sale of synthetic marijuana
as a deceptive trade practice); id. § 6-1-112(1) (e) (authorizing civil penalties).
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emergencies caused by the smoking or ingestion of [synthetic marijuana] prod-
ucts."" Moving beyond the chemical approach empowers cities to respond di-
rectly to harms in their communities and to marshal evidence of these harms to
build claims instead of relying on chemical testing. Cities can benefit from in-
junctive relief without perpetuating the criminalization of low-level drug of-
fenses and, by increasing the availability of civil penalties, will be incentivized to
target commercial defendants with deep pockets rather than low-level users. Ide-
ally, successful itigation will also produce a deterrent effect beyond retailers that
are directly targeted.76
2. In response to the variability of synthetic marijuana, local ordinances
should avoid relying on unitary definitions of the drug for a dynamic under-
standing. Specifically, the laws should incorporate multiple definitional bases of
regulation, rather than exclusively chemical definitions, in order to open up ad-
ditional avenues of liability." While many ordinances still rely on chemical def-
initions," versatile statutory definitions have taken hold in several municipali-
ties. An ordinance banning synthetic marijuana in Houston prohibits the sale of
controlled synthetic cannabinoids as well as " [a] ny vegetative material, . .. with
packaging or labeling that indicates, suggests, or implies" similarity to natural
marijuana." New York City similarly declares that "it shall be no defense that
the substance's packaging or other representation states or indicates that the sub-
stance is not intended for human consumption."o Finally, Charlotte County,
Florida considers cost, verbal and written representations, manner of sale, and
other relevant factors to identify drug products.
Allowing for flexibility in the identification of synthetic marijuana helps to
avoid the problems posed by its changing chemical composition. Not all new
75. United States v. Elder, No. 4:15CR3091, 2017 WL 499917, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 7,2017).
76. Cf Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Synergy of Toxic Tort Law and Public Health: Lessons from a
Century of Cigarettes, 41 CONN. L. REV. 561, 564 (2008) (describing the public health goals of
toxic tort litigation).
77. See supra Section I.C.
78. See generally City Ordinances-Synthetic Substances, upra note 35 (compiling city ordinances
regulating synthetic substances).
79. Hous., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. XVII, § 28-571 (2017).
8o. N.Y.C., NY, ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 203(4)(g) (2017).
Si. CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FA., CODE OF LAwS AND ORDINANCES pt. II, ch. 2-5, art. VI, § 2-5-
153(b) (2017).
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legislation has proceeded along these lines; both Boston8 2 and Chicago," for ex-
ample, have passed synthetic marijuana ordinances defining the product exclu-
sively in chemical terms, leaving these cities with less flexibility in enforcement.
3. Even with a flexible definition of synthetic marijuana, local authorities
would still be dependent on private litigants to bring actions. In order to em-
power authorities with the expertise and incentive to address the public health
concerns, legislatures hould vest litigation authority in local public attorneys to
bring civil actions on the basis of public nuisance,84 unfair competition, or sim-
ilar causes of action. As with statutory definitions of synthetic marijuana, some
jurisdictions have embraced more robust roles for public attorneys in bringing
civil claims against synthetic marijuana retailers. City attorneys are expressly au-
thorized to bring civil actions against synthetic marijuana retailers in Ken-
dallville, Indiana;` Portage, Indiana;8 6 and Levelland, Texas,8 7 among others.
New York City, by contrast, authorizes seizure by police officers, sheriffs, and
peace officers and delegates rulemaking authority to various state commission-
ers, but does not provide causes of action for counsel for the City." While crim-
inal enforcement authority is appropriately vested in law enforcement officials,
local government civil attorneys possess the expertise to litigate civil actions
against commercial actors. However, current consumer protection legislation
provides most of these local bodies with relatively little scope to pursue actions
against deceptive retail and trade practices." To be sure, allowing local counsel
to litigate civil actions alongside a parallel criminal enforcement regime may lead
to challenges in coordination. The degree of coordination between police and
82. Bos., MASS., MUN. CODE ch. 16, § 59.2 (2017) ("Synthetic cannabinoids hall mean any chemi-
cal compound chemically synthesized and either 1) has been demonstrated to have binding
activity at one or more cannabinoid receptors; or 2) is a chemical analogue or isomer of a
compound that has been demonstrated to have binding activity at one or more cannabinoid
receptors.").
83. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 4-4, § 333 (2017)-
84. Legislation can also ease the evidentiary burden on public attorneys insofar as violation of
statutes can be prima facie evidence of civil liability under per se nuisance claims.
85. IENDALLVILLE, IND., CODE OF ORDINANCEs ch. 9, § 6(f) (2017).
86. PORTAGE, IND., MUN. CODE ch. 18, art. IX, § 18-351 (2017).
87. LEVELLAND, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4.1204 (2017).
88. N.Y.C., NY, ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 203(4)(g) (2017).
89. See Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection
Laws, 4o FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1906 (2013) (noting that among the fifty state-level "little"
FTC Acts, "only seven permit city and county enforcement, and only eleven permit district
attorney enforcement" (citations omitted)).
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city or county attorneys' offices that is feasible is likely to vary across jurisdic-
tions. However, this approach is not new; simultaneous civil and criminal en-
forcement efforts have been used to taclde complex public health and morals is-
sues ranging from sex trafficking 0 to illegal gambling." Synthetic marijuana
may benefit from a similar regime, in which local police and federal agents share
responsibility for criminal enforcement and municipal lawyers focus on address-
ing consumer harms and removing safe harbors for businesses engaged in de-
ceptive and illegal practices. And, as noted above, increasing the availability of
injunctive and monetary relief will ideally incentivize cities to shift towards civil
actions against commercial defendants instead of policing low-level offenders.
B. Synthetic Marijuana as Manifestly Unreasonable Design
Local governments have increasingly recognized synthetic marijuana as a
public health crisis worthy of legislative attention.9 2 Such a crisis might be best
addressed through legislative reform enabling public ivil actions, private litiga-
tion, or a combination of the two." While legislative reform would provide a
broader and more enduring strategy, the realities of the political process may
cause such changes to happen gradually across jurisdictions. In the short term,
private plaintiffs' advocates have another potential recourse against retailers un-
der the MUD doctrine.
In the case of synthetic marijuana, a products liability claim against retailers
would arise out of the product's defective design. Ordinarily, a plaintiff alleging
defective design must compare the harms and benefits of the product's existing
go. While local police and numerous federal agencies engage in the criminal investigation and
prosecution of sex-trafficking offenses, attorneys general and city attorneys have gone after
both online and brick-and-mortar businesses that provide shelter for sex traffickers. One ex-
ample is the recent litigation against Backpage.com, alleging that the website's business prac-
tices enabled traffickers to advertise their victims. See Doe No. i v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817
F.3d 12 (ist Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017).
91. Similarly, while gambling is often dealt with through criminal regimes, municipal code en-
forcement has proven useful in shutting down physical gambling venues. See, e.g., Illegal Gam-
bling Cafj To Close, as Gambling Software Company Ends Business Statewide, CITY ATT'Y S.F.
(Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.sfcityattorney.org/2o14/ol/30/illegal-gambling-cafe-to
-close-as- gambling-software-company-ends-business-statewide [http://perma.cc/M3Z7-
MQFM].
92. See City Ordinances- Synthetic Substances, upra note 35.
93. See Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence
from Insurance Class Actions, 1 J. TORT L. 2 (2007); Patrick W. Schmitz, On the joint Use of
Liability and Safety Regulation, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 371 (2000); Steven Shavell, Liability
for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
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design with a proposed reasonable alternative design (RAD) 94 and demonstrate
that the defendant failed to adopt a RAD that would have prevented the injury.
However, the Third Restatement suggests a narrow class of highly dangerous
products with such high risks and "little legitimate purpose in today's society"
that no RAD showing is needed to establish liability. 9 6
A MUD claim against synthetic marijuana retailers would allow injured par-
ties to recover directly, immediately, and under a more favorable burden of proof
than that present in a criminal trial. Although plaintiffs have persistently had
trouble proving MUD claims,97 there are compelling reasons for courts to apply
this doctrine to commercial sales of synthetic marijuana. First, the drug's incon-
sistent composition prevents even regular users from ascertaining the risks of
consumption and renders it egregiously unsafe. Against this extreme danger,
there are few -if any -countervailing therapeutic benefits.98 Retailers also de-
liberately shroud the risks from consumers; deceptive packaging and labeling
prevents consumers from forming reasonable predictions about the risks they
will incur from use.99 Conceptually, then, synthetic marijuana lends itself to the
designation of a MUD.
94. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 2 cmt. d ("[T]he standard for judging the defectiveness of
product designs ... is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have
reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission
of the alternative design . .. rendered the product not reasonably safe.").
95. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 4 9 7 A.2d 1143, 1156 (Md. 1985); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note
30, § 2 cmt. d (discussing design defects more generally).
96. See Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 152 A.3d 1183, 1194 (Conn. 2016) ("Few products will have
such a marginal utility and such a high degree of risk . .. that will satisfy the manifestly un-
reasonable standard."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 2 cmt. b ("This Restatement recog-
nizes the possibility that product sellers may be subject to liability even absent a reasonable
alternative design when the product design is manifestly unreasonable.").
97. See, e.g., Karavitis v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 3d 235, 252, 255 (D. Conn. 2017) (finding
that a product used in construction did not fit MUD criteria because, far from having no social
value, "the Circular Saw's utility appears substantial"), appeal docketed, No. 17-1008 (2d Cir.
Apr. 7, 2017); Junk v. Terminix Int'l. Co., No. 4:o5-CV-o608-JAJ, 2008 WL 5191865, at *4
(S.D. Iowa Nov. 3, 2008) (declining to find MUD liability against pesticide manufacturer,
citing evidence of product's utility and widespread use), aff'd, 628 F.3d 439 (8th Cit. 2010);
Parish v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 20o6) (finding no MUD
liability for trampoline manufacturer because the product's social utility exceeded its harms).
98. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 2 cmt. e (stating that in a MUD case, "[t]he court would
declare the product design to be defective and not reasonably safe because the extremely high
degree of danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible
social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would
choose to use, or to allow children to use, the product").
99. See Bifolck, 1 52 A. 3d at 1203 (recognizing a MUD classification for products for which "the risk
of harm so clearly exceeds the product's utility that a reasonable consumer, informed of those
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Second, classifying synthetic marijuana as manifestly unreasonable is con-
sistent with tort doctrine. Synthetic marijuana comports with other legislative
and judicial recognition of products to which a MUD designation might apply,
including products "marketed for use in dangerous criminal activities"; 0 0 those
valuable in criminal activity due to "easy concealability and low price"; 1' and
those possessing a "low social utility and high degree of danger."102
Legislators are increasingly recognizing the desirability of totally removing
synthetic marijuana from the market - numerous state legislatures as well as cit-
ies and Congress have expressed concern about the dangers of synthetic mariju-
ana and its ubiquity.o Far from usurping a legislative function or making a
premature determination about the drug's dangerousness, bringing tort claims
against synthetic marijuana retailers gives substance to a legislative purpose that
has otherwise lacked meaningful enforcement. Using MUD claims to fill the
gaps in state and federal regulation is not new. The Maryland Supreme Court
took such an approach in Kelley v. R. G. Industries, a case brought by the victim of
a grocery store robbery against the manufacturer of a cheap and highly danger-
ous handgun known as a "Saturday Night Special."104 The court opined that a
MUD-type claim might lie. 0 s The court found that a MUD-type classification
could be appropriate in part because an examination of the treatment of Saturday
Night Specials in state and federal gun control statutes suggested that the weap-
ons were unfit for any legitimate use, notwithstanding a general right to own
and carry private handguns.106 Similarly, a MUD claim against a synthetic ma-
rijuana retailer would further the legislative goal of removing a dangerous and
unpredictable substance from circulation.
risks and utility, would not purchase the product. The factors that a jury may consider include,
but are not limited to, the magnitude and probability of the risk of harm, the instructions and
warnings accompanying the product, the utility of the product in relation to the range of con-
sumer choices among products, and the nature and strength of consumer expectations regard-
ing the product, including expectations arising from product portrayal and marketing").
100. S. 2805, 1987 Gen. Assemb. 3, 5 (N.J. 1987).
101. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 4 9 7 A.2d 1143,1158 (Md. 1985).
102. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, S 2 cmt. (e).
103. See Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993; City
Ordinances - Synthetic Substances, upra note 35; Emerging Drug Threats, supra note 34.
104. 497 A.2d at 1143. Although the court did not refer to the MUD classification by name, the
court opined on why the product was unreasonably dangerous, and the case is nonetheless
considered a canonical example of MUD analysis. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations
of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1700, 1721-22 (2003).
105. Kelley, 4 9 7 A.2d at 1145.
io6. Id. at 1153 ("There is, however, a limited category of handguns which clearly is not sanctioned
as a matter of public policy.").
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Critics have raised concerns about the fairness of the MUD doctrine to re-
tailers and manufacturers and its potentially undesirable effects on the market-
place as well as personal autonomy and consumer choice.o Some advocates
have argued that consumers are "in the best position to decide" whether to make
use of optional safety features and that categorical product liability reduces the
range of products available in the marketplace.0 8 Early commentators also wor-
ried that MUD doctrine might run distributors of necessarily dangerous but
"common and popular" products, such as cigarettes, alcohol, and trampolines,
out of business.10' RichardAusness argues that the "economic influence" of some
major industries - such as the automobile manufacturing - "arguably justifies
the creation of doctrines that limit their liability for the sale of products that may
be sub-optimally safe'" 0 Finally, Michael Toke has argued that "declaring a
product illegal is a decision that should properly be left to [a] state's legisla-
ture."
MUD claims are unarguably a strong remedy, appropriate only for truly use-
less and dangerous products. Synthetic marijuana, however, is just one of those
inherently dangerous and pointless goods. Concerns about consumer choice
have less force with respect to a product whose risks are virtually unknowable to
the average consumer and therefore resistant to rational choice theories.1 12 Nor
are there concerns about the spillover effects of denying the market a valuable
and widespread consumer commodity. Moreover, although some strands of syn-
thetic marijuana remain technically legal, legislatures have attempted to prohibit
their use. Other concerns about market interference are less pressing in the con-
text of synthetic marijuana. Liability that affects market transactions is more
problematic when a product's design "reflect [s] the design engineer's deliberate
and calculated judgment to accept certain risks in return for an increase in overall
107. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, "Danger Is My Business": The Right To Manufacture Unsafe Prod-
ucts, 67 ARK. L. REv. 827 (2014).
io8. Id. at 847 (citing Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1981), aff'd,
434 N.E.2d 1345 (N.Y. 1982)).
iog. Michael J. Toke, Note, Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the Com-
ment d Caveat Should Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1181, 1184,
1208 (1996); see also Richard C. Ausness, Product Category Liability: A Critical Analysis, 24 N.
KY. L. REV. 423 (1997) (arguing against categorical liability for products whose risks outweigh
their benefits).
11o. Ausness, supra note 107, at 869.
iii. Toke, supra note lo9, at 1213 (citing Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 658 (Wash.
1986)).
112. Contra Ausness, supra note lo9, at 428.
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benefit." For example, the tradeoffs between a car's fuel economy and its resili-
ence in a collision is a purposeful design choice that presumably incorporates
market preferences." Conversely, the motivation behind the risks in synthetic
marijuana's design - such as deceptive labeling and inconsistent formulas - is
not to increase social welfare but to avoid criminal prosecution for distributors.
Synthetic marijuana therefore ought to prove more resistant to traditional ob-
jections to MUD claims than products that have preceded it.
A more significant practical concern is what kinds of plaintiffs will be willing
and able to bring claims against synthetic marijuana retailers. Users who expe-
rience severe and unexpected health consequences are most directly affected by
the drug. However, there may be difficulties in turning consumers into plaintiffs,
particularly if litigation requires admitting to illegal drug use in a state that crim-
inalizes the use or possession of synthetic marijuana. It is also possible that
courts will consider the perceived "moral position of the victim" in determining
who is responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.114 Nevertheless, such arguments
may be less persuasive in light of synthetic marijuana manufacturers' conceal-
ment of information from which users could deduce risks." Additionally, other
parties may be able to avoid some of these obstacles. Family members of indi-
viduals who have died from synthetic drug overdoses have already begun to
bring wrongful death lawsuits against drug manufacturers and retailers.116
While at least one of these cases was based on a negligence theory,"' MUD
claims represent an additional avenue of recourse for these families. Advocacy
groups representing members directly and disproportionately affected by syn-
thetic marijuana - such as people experiencing homelessness or at-risk youth -
could also play an important role.
One might object that using MUD claims for synthetic marijuana would only
give regulators more tools to prosecute the war on drugs, which has been disas-
trous for a multitude of reasons and whose casualties have come from marginal-
ized populations." However, the inclusion of synthetic drugs within the MUD
113. Toke, supra note lo9, at 1203.
114. Ausness, supra note lo9, at 448.
115. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative
Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429, 1453-54 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Family Sues Alleged Synthetic Drugmaker, CBS 46 (Aug. 31, 2012, 10:54 AM),
http://www.cbs46.com/story/19433077/family-sues-alleged-synthetic-drug-maker [http://
perma.cc/QJ5D-3HZD]; Puente, supra note 41.
117. See Jim McBride, Killer K2: Mother Sues Smoke Shop over Son's Death, AMARiLLo GLOBE-NEWS
(July 19, 2016, 11:38 AM), http://amarillo.com/news/2o13-lo-ol/mother-sues-local
-smoke-shop-over-sons-k2-related-death [http://perma.cc/BD9M-X455].
11s. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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framework does not require classifying all drugs, including natural marijuana,
as having MUDs. Unlike natural marijuana, for instance, synthetic marijuana
has no demonstrated therapeutic benefits, and it poses a substantially higher isk
of injury and death."' More fundamentally, nonsynthetic drugs are rarely pre-
sented in conventional marketplaces as "products," marketed in colorful pack-
aging on store shelves to appeal to teenagers, or labeled as consumer commodi-
ties in an attempt to evade regulation. Instead, they are traded and therefore
policed in underground economies or, where legalized, sold on the open market
in a transparent manner. Because the illicit status of natural marijuana is not in
question in most jurisdictions, as it is for synthetic marijuana, there is less need
for a complementary civil liability regime to fill the gaps left by criminal enforce-
ment.12 0
Ultimately, providing a legislative basis to equip local attorneys to bring a
wide range of tort claims against synthetic marijuana retailers offers advantages
over tort litigation by private plaintiffs. Because of synthetic marijuana's uncon-
ventional and haphazard production process, public health and consumer pro-
tection officials have a better sense of the product's overall risks than individual
consumers.12 1 And, as the previous section has suggested, these consumers may
not be well positioned to bring lawsuits.12 2 Moreover, a regulatory regime - par-
ticularly one that incorporates multiple definitional bases2 3 -provides clear no-
tice to retailers of which substances are prohibited and, if it is sufficiently com-
prehensive, may do more to patch loopholes than a series of individual lawsuits
advancing novel legal claims.124 Accordingly, a robust regulatory regime coupled
with local civil regulatory regimes is preferable as a solution to the challenges
law enforcement has faced under chemically-based criminal approaches.
ig. See, e.g., Elsheshtawy et al., supra note 17; Sherpa et al., supra note 17.
120. To the extent that such a regime is needed, it can likely be provided by public nuisance.
121. See Shavell, supra note 93, at 359-60 (noting that differences in knowledge about risk are a
factor in deciding between regulation and liability; if experts are better informed, regulation
is better; and that although private parties might generally be assumed to have better
knowledge, this is not the case where "information about risk will not be an obvious by-prod-
uct of engaging in risky activities").
122. See Helland & Klick, supra note 93, at 3-4 (finding that liability regimes are at a disadvantage
relative to regulatory regimes when there is a stronger likelihood that private litigants will not
pursue claims when they are harmed).
123. See supra Section II.A.
124. See Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation
ofInnovations, 52 SANTA CIAuL. REv. 1241,1242, 1248-52 (2012) (noting that novel tort claims
in court may not address the full range of or most salient risks of a new product and may
produce suboptimal rules with "surprising persistence").
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CONCLUSION
New and innovative responses are required to address the challenges posed
by synthetic marijuana. This Comment has proposed both short- and long-term
strategies for enforcement against synthetic marijuana retailers engaged in de-
ceptive and harmful practices. Underscoring both of these proposals is the idea
that regulatory efforts should conceptualize synthetic marijuana not only in
terms of its chemical basis but through the ways it is represented as a product in
commercial marketplaces. Moving towards this representational understanding
allows for more robust regulation of synthetic marijuana retailers, particularly
through the expansion of civil liability regimes based in tort and advanced at the
local level. Ultimately, lawyers should endeavor to be as creative in their regula-
tory efforts as retailers of synthetic marijuana have been in their attempts to
evade regulation and pursue liability regimes that are up to the task.
SOPHIA HOUSE*
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